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a 2x2 design, the effects of deviation costs and loss avoidance. Our results provide additional insights into the 
parametric determinants of laboratory coordination failures, and successes.
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1. Introduction 
 
Coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria have attracted major attention over the 
past two decades, as path-breaking experimental studies (Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil 
[henceforth VHBB] 1990, 1991; Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe and Ross 1990, 1992) were 
widely interpreted as suggesting that coordination failure -- here interpreted as failure to 
coordinate on the efficient equilibrium -- is a common phenomenon in the laboratory. In 
Devetag and Ortmann (2007), we argue that coordination failures are less common than 
is widely perceived (e.g., Ochs 1995 and Camerer 2003). We argue that by now it is well 
understood how coordination successes can be engineered in the lab and we formulate 
specific conjectures about the impact of deviation costs and loss avoidance (see Cachon 
and Camerer 1996 and Rydval and Ortmann 2005 for related studies). 
 
To test these conjectures, we use the original version of the median action game first 
studied by VHBB (1991). Early results on the median action game had shown both a high 
frequency of coordination failure and strong history-dependence, in that the last-round 
median always equaled the first-round median in all treatments. In our experiments, we 
test the robustness of these results by manipulating two parametric determinants related 
to the original payoff function in VHBB (1991): the presence of negative/positive payoffs 
in the earnings tables; and the presence of linear/nonlinear deviation costs, i.e., the 
opportunity costs of deviating from the best response to a given median. The effect of the 
first determinant has been tested by Cachon and Camerer (1996), while the effect of 
lowering deviation costs has been studied by Goeree and Holt (2005) and Battalio et al. 
(2001). However, no previous study has systematically investigated the separate and  
joint effects of changes in these two determinants of the VHBB (1991) median action 
game. More specifically, and unlike the previous studies, we employ the same payoff 
function used in VHBB (1991) in our baseline treatment. Furthermore, we employ the 
same (large) group size and the same information conditions.  
 
2. Design 
 
In order to test our conjectures, we chose the following 2x2 design summarized in Table 
I, where Neg stands for earnings tables that contain negative payoffs and Non-lin stands 
for non-linear deviation costs: 
 
 
Table I here 
 
"A" is mnemonic for the anchor of  Table I and is identical to the key earnings table in 
VHBB (1991) while B, C, and D are our treatments.  
 
Specifically, the four earnings tables A – D look like this:  
 
                 Table A here  
 
Clearly, Table A features negative payoffs and non-linear deviation costs; for example, 
the opportunity cost of picking action 4 when the current median is 3 equals 5 cents, 
whereas the deviation cost rises non-linearly to 45 cents when action 6 is picked.  In B, 
negative payoffs have been eliminated by adding 1.30 to all payoffs.1  
 
 Table B here 
        
Table C shows the results from substituting the squared term in VHBB (1991):  
 
  
€ 
π ei( ) = aM − b M − ei[ ]
2
+ c , 
 
where M = median,  i ε {1, 2,….,7}, a=0.10, b=0.05, c=0.60, with the absolute value 
(linearizing deviation costs), and by setting parameter b equal to .30.2   
  
Table C here 
         
In D, we have only changed the last term of the payoff function in VHBB (1991) by 
substituting the squared term with the absolute value.   
 
Table D here              
 
The elimination of the squared term results in positive payoffs.3   
 
Negative payoffs in the original payoff table (A) appear in the upper right and lower left 
corner, which might explain the clustering of initial choices just above the secure action. 
Removing negative payoffs eliminates a potential reason for not picking the efficient 
action. Linearized deviation costs lower the opportunity costs of choices far above the 
current median, thus encouraging exploration in the direction of efficiency. Hence, our 
main hypothesis is that the absence of negative payoffs and linear deviation costs are both 
efficiency-enhancing features; therefore, we expect to observe a higher incidence of 
coordination success in the experimental treatments compared to the anchor, ceteris 
paribus. However, since in treatment C deviation costs are higher than in the baseline for 
"small" deviations, observing less coordination in C than in the remaining treatments is a 
possibility.   
 
 
 
                                                
1  In B, deviation costs are the same in absolute terms but not in relative terms. This seems 
unavoidable. 
2  This way we recapture negative payoffs. The implied change in the size of the (now linearized) 
deviation costs seems unavoidable although we would have liked to avoid it since it was likely to affect the 
probability of coordination failure.   
3 Again unavoidably, this change relocated the secure equilibrium from Choice 3 to Choice 1.  
3. Implementation 
 
Experiments were conducted with 16 groups of players in 8 sessions using a between-
subject design. We obtained 4 independent data points for each treatment. 
      
Table II here    
   
We exactly replicated the design in VHBB (1991).  Groups of 9 subjects played the stage 
game for a total of 10 rounds. Each session included 18 subjects who were seated 
randomly at computer terminals. The instructions specified that subjects would 
participate in a "market" that would last for ten rounds.4 They would be divided into two 
groups randomly by the computer program at the beginning of the experiment, and the 
group composition would remain fixed for the whole duration of the market. Payoffs 
were expressed in experimental currency units, to be converted into Euros at the end of 
the experiment. In an effort to keep the maximum potential gain in Euros constant across 
treatments, the conversion rate used in B was half that of the remaining treatments. At the 
end of each round, each subject received information about the group median for that 
round and his or her resulting individual payoff. No information was given about the 
individual choices and payoffs of the other players throughout the experiment. Before 
starting the experiment, subjects had to answer some questions to ensure that everybody 
understood how to calculate the median of a series of numbers and how payoffs were 
computed on the basis of the earnings table.  
 
4. Results 
 
Table III reports the median and mode of choices in the first round, pooled across groups 
and divided by treatment. Figure 1 reports the entire distribution of first-round choices, 
divided by treatment (each treatment in the first round contains 36 independent 
observations).   Table IV reports the observed medians in the first and last rounds of play; 
these medians are reported separately for each group and treatment and hence add a 
temporal dimension. 
  
Turning to the first-round results, we have six observations: first, the median choice in 
treatment A reflects the typical case of coordination failure found in previous 
experiments  (e.g., VHBB 1991, Cachon and Camerer 1996, Blume and Ortmann 2007). 
In contrast, in treatment D the median choice is the efficient one, confirming our key 
conjecture. Second, contrary to all other experiments that we know (see Devetag and 
Ortmann 2007), the modal choice in treatment A is the choice that induces the efficient 
equilibrium. The typical modal choice in the previous experiments, action 4 or 5, is less  
preferred in our case. Third, the efficient choice is also the modal choice for treatment D. 
In terms of the modal choice, although we do see the distribution of choices shift in the 
hypothesized direction, the hypothesized joint effect of deviation costs and loss aversion  
turns out to be statistically non-significant given our number of independent observations. 
                                                
4  The term "market" was also used in VHBB (1991).   
Essentially, the baseline results are "too good" to allow for the hypothesized effect to 
materialize in a statistically significant manner given our original implementation plans. 
Fourth, the surprising results of treatment A also affect the hypothesized effects of 
treatments B and C.  Specifically, using a Mann-Whitney U test, we do not get a 
significant difference going from A to B, or going from A to C.  Fifth, we find highly 
significant differences going both from treatment B to D (p<.01, one-tailed), and from 
treatment C to D (p<.01, one-tailed). Sixth, as hypothesized, in treatment D, in which 
there are only positive payoffs and deviation costs are linear (and, recall footnote 2, 
somewhat lower than in treatment C), the percentage of players picking the efficient 
action 7 is the highest (55%) relative to all other treatments.   
 
Figure 1 here 
 
Table III here 
 
Table IV here  
 
The data in Table IV exhibit the inertia phenomenon that was documented in previous 
experiments. Specifically, in both rounds 1 and 10, the modal median is 6 for treatment 
A, 5 for treatments B and C, and 7 in treatment D.  
 
In summary, in the presence of only positive payoffs and linear deviation costs (our 
treatment D), the modal outcome is one of successful coordination on the efficient 
equilibrium, which is in line with our hypothesis. The data from treatment C suggest, 
quite in line with our intuition, that the magnitude of deviation costs also plays a role in 
determining coordination success, similarly to what was obtained by Goeree and Holt 
(2005) for a different group size and a different matching protocol. The data from 
treatment B suggest, contradicting our priors, that positive payoffs alone are not sufficient 
to generate successful coordination.    
 
5. Discussion 
 
Using the original median action game first studied by VHBB 1991, we have reported 
experimental sessions designed to replicate VHBB's main findings and to test our 
conjectures on the impact of deviation costs and loss avoidance. Our replication ceteris 
paribus shows higher coordination efficiency compared to the original experiment. In 
addition, by and far, our results suggest that some combination of loss avoidance and low,  
linear deviation costs is efficiency-enhancing. In effect, it seems that when going from 
treatment A to treatment D, simply changing the nonlinear term of the generating 
function used in VHBB (1991) made the difference between coordination failure and 
coordination success. Our results add to our understanding of what it takes to engineer 
coordination successes in the laboratory. 
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Table I. Experimental Design 
 
    Neg Pos 
 
 Non-lin            A B 
        Lin  C D 
 
 
 
 
 
Payoff Table A    Median value of X chosen 
    7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Your choice of X 7 1.30 1.15 0.90 0.55 0.10 -0.45 -1.10 
   6 1.25 1.20 1.05 0.8 0.45 0.00 -0.55 
   5 1.10 1.15 1.10 0.95 0.70 0.35 -0.10 
   4 0.85 1.00 1.05 1.00 0.85 0.60 0.25 
   3 0.50 0.75 0.90 0.95 0.90 0.75 0.50 
   2 0.05 0.40 0.65 0.80 0.85 0.80 0.65 
   1 -0.5 -0.05 0.3 0.55 0.70 0.75 0.70 
  
            
 
Payoff Table B    Median value of X chosen 
    7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Your choice of X 7 2.60 2.45 2.20 1.85 1.40 0.85 0.20 
   6 2.55 2.50 2.35 2.10 1.75 1.30 0.75 
   5 2.40 2.45 2.40 2.25 2.00 1.65 1.20 
   4 2.15 2.30 2.35 2.30 2.15 1.90 1.55 
   3 1.80 2.05 2.20 2.25 2.20 2.05 1.80 
   2 1.35 1.70 1.95 2.10 2.15 2.10 1.95 
   1 0.80 1.25 1.60 1.85 2.00 2.05 2.00 
 
 
 
Payoff Table C    Median value of X chosen 
    7  6   5   4   3   2    1 
Your choice of X 7 1.30 0.90 0.50 0.10    -0.30   -0.70       -1.10 
   6 1.00 1.20 0.80 0.40 0.00    -0.40      -0.80 
   5 0.70 0.90 1.10 0.70 0.30    -0.10      -0.50 
   4 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 0.60 0.20      -0.20 
   3 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90 0.50  0.10 
   2 -0.20 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80    0.40 
   1 -0.50   -0.30   -0.10 0.10 0.30 0.50  0.70 
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Payoff Table D    Median value of X chosen 
    7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Your choice of X 7 1.30 1.15 1.00 0.85 0.70 0.55 0.35 
   6 1.25 1.20 1.05 0.90 0.75 0.60 0.40 
   5 1.20 1.15 1.10 0.95 0.80 0.65 0.45 
   4 1.15 1.10 1.05 1.00 0.85 0.70 0.55 
   3 1.10 1.05 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.75 0.60 
   2 1.05 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.65 
   1 1.00 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.80 0.75 0.70 
 
 
 
Table II. Experiment Implementation     
 
        Treatment  
       A B C D 
     Groups   4  4  4  4 
    Rounds  10 10 10 10 
 
 
 
Table III. Median and modal choice by treatment       
 
 A B C D 
N 36 36 36 36 
median 6 5 5 7 
mode 7 4 7 7  
 
  Table IV. Median in the 1st and 10th round of play, divided by group and treatment. 
  
 
Treatment A A A A B B B   B C C C C D D D D 
Group 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
1st round median 5 6 6 7 5 6 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 7 6 7 
10throundmedian 6 6 6 6 5 6 5 4 5 5 6 5 7 7 7 6 
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Fig. 1. Distribution of first round choices in the four treatments (in percentages) 
  
 
 
  
 
